Value pluralism and absolute moral judgments essay

Ethical absolutes The ancient Stoics has a maxim let Justice be done though the heavens fall. In this way, the Stoics expressed their view that Justice was an absolute value which could never be violated under any circumstances.

Value pluralism and absolute moral judgments essay

Developmental and Social Psychology Dewey argues that the function of value judgments is to guide human conduct, understood broadly to include conscious and unconscious bodily motion, observation, reflection, imagination, judgment, and affective responses.

There are three levels of conduct: These differ according to how far they are guided by ideas of what one is doing. Impulses include drives, appetites, instincts, and reflexes.

Impulsive activity is not purposive. It involves no idea of an end to be achieved by the activity. But it has no idea that this will be a consequence of its sucking, and does not suck with the end in view of obtaining food HNC 65— First, it takes activity rather than rest as the default state of human beings.

Desires are defined by the states of affairs they aim to achieve. On this model, action needs to be inspired by an idea of some deficit. Once the deficit is repaired, the desire is fulfilled, and the organism returns to a state of rest. Dewey observed that this model does not fit what we know about children.

Meta Ethics Essay Sample

They are constantly in motion even when they achieve no particular purpose in moving. Second, impulse psychology stresses the plasticity of the sources of conduct. Desires are fixed by their ends. Impulses can be directed and shaped toward various ends.

A newborn infant cries when it is hungry, at first with no end in view. It observes that crying results in a feeding, which relieves its hunger. It gets the idea that by crying, it can get relief. When crying is prompted by this idea, the child sees it as a means to a further end, and acts for the first time on a desire that is, with an end in view TV —8.

This plasticity of ends and means is possible because the original source of activity is impulse, not desire. They channel impulses in specified directions, toward certain outcomes, by entrenching particular uses of means, prescribing certain conduct in particular circumstances.

While individuals may have idiosyncratic habits, the most important habits are customs, shared habits of a group that are passed on to children through socialization. Customs originate in purposive activity.


Every society must devise means for the satisfaction of basic human needs for food, shelter, clothing, and affiliation, for coping with interpersonal conflict within the group and treatment of outsiders, for dealing with critical events such as birth, coming of age, and death.

Customary ways of satisfying needs shape the direction of impulse in the socialized individual. A young child just starting on solid food may be open to eating nearly anything.

But every society limits what it counts as edible. Certain foods become freighted with social meaning —as suitable for celebrating birthdays, good for serving to guests, reserved for sacrifice to the gods, or fit only for animals.

Moral Relativism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

She may recoil in disgust or horror from certain edibles deemed taboo or unclean. There may have been a rationale for the original selection of foods. Perhaps some food was deemed taboo when its consumption was followed by a natural disaster, and people concluded that the gods were angry at them for consuming it.

But the habit of avoiding it may persist long after its original rationale is forgotten E 39—48, HNC 15—21, 43—7. Once people have learned how to achieve some purpose through habit or skill, they no longer need to tend to what they are doing.

Because they operate subconsciously, habits may continue after their original rationale has been forgotten or repudiated. Because they entrench modes of conduct rather than ends in view, they may produce unintended results when the environment changes. We can reliably produce alternative results only by acquiring a new habit.

Discovering the means required to change habits requires psychological and sociological inquiry, not just conscientiousness and willpower. It is magical thinking to suppose that we can change habits through conscious willing, when we lack knowledge of the means of change. Nor can we check their operation through monitoring, since they operate behind our backs.Value Pluralism and the Problem of Judgment: Farewell to Public Reason Linda M.

Developmental and Social Psychology

G. Zerilli1 Abstract This essay examines the significantly different approaches of John Rawls and Hannah Arendt to the problem of judgment in democratic theory and that radically altered how he thought about the relationship of absolute moral claims to politics.

However, metaethical moral relativist views are sometimes regarded as connected with positions that say moral judgments lack truth-value, since the relativist views contend that moral judgments lack truth-value in an absolute or universal sense.

Value Pluralism and Absolute Moral Judgments Essay Words 7 Pages Widespread and deep moral disagreements are persistently resistant to rational solutions and thus allow for continuing debate over the validity of moral judgments.

Free Essay: Widespread and deep moral disagreements are persistently resistant to rational solutions and thus allow for continuing debate over the validity. Value Pluralism and Absolute Moral Judgments Essay Words | 7 Pages. Widespread and deep moral disagreements are persistently resistant to rational solutions and thus allow for continuing debate over the validity of moral judgments.

Value pluralism and absolute moral judgments essay

Differences between Moral Relativism and Moral Pluralism Moral Relativism Moral Pluralism No fixed absolute morality Existence of different ‘right’ moralities Particular Diversity No Universal morality Universal Morality Right ordering of values No right ordering of values Humility Humility Tolerance to other cultures Respect and .

Moral Relativism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)